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Murphy's claim that his sentence was the product of ethnic discrimina-
tion and found instead that Murphy possessed a greater degree of
culpability than the codefendants. 42 Even if discrimination was in-
volved, the court reasoned that Murphy failed to offer any evidence that
his consulate could have provided him with assistance not provided by
his counsel.
43
Likewise, the court rejected Murphy's claim that he was prejudiced
by his inability to obtain mitigating evidence through his consulate. In
rejecting this claim, the court cited the district court's finding that
Murphy made no showing of what evidence his consulate would have
provided.44 According to the court of appeals,Murphy didnot show how
he needed the consulate's help in order to obtain character testimony, and
even if he had, the court did not see how such testimony would have been
any different from that offered at Murphy's sentencing hearing.
wife, who refused a bargain, was convicted and sentenced to life.
Murphy was the only one of the six not offered a plea bargain.
42 Id. The court agreed with the prosecutor's determination that
Murphy was more culpable because of his primary role in the murder and
his efforts to recruit others to help carry out the murder.
43 Id.
44Murphy, 116 F.3d at 101.
In these few sentences, the court of appeals managed to establish an
extremely high standard for capital defendants attempting to show the
existence of prejudice from a procedurally defaulted Vienna Convention
claim. Murphy illustrates that, in the eyes of the court of appeals, it
simply will not be enough to say the defendant might have obtained this
evidence or assistance if the defendant had received his Convention
rights. Habeas counsel will have to produce actual evidence that the
defendant would have received from his or her consulate. For example,
if counsel wanted to submit testimony of a character witness, counsel
would actually have to produce the witness and the witness' testimony.
This requirement of actuality also applies to the contents of any records
that a consulate would have acquired on behalf of the defendant.
Consequently, counsel must present as much actual evidence as possible
in order to prevail on a showing of prejudice on a procedurally defaulted
claim.
The fundamental lesson here is that capital defense counsel should
avoid a procedural default bind at all costs, but if counsel does find a
client in such a situation, counsel must make showings of both cause and
actual prejudice.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary K. Martin
POPE v. NETHERLAND
113 F.3d 1364 (4th Cir. 1997)1
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On the evening of January 12, 1986, Carlton Jerome Pope shot and
killed Cynthia Gray. While sitting in her car in the parking lot of "Nicks
Pool Hall" in downtown Portsmouth with Marcie Ann Kirchheimer,
Gray and Kirchheimer were approached by Pope. Pope asked Gray for
a ride home and she agreed. Pope got into the back seat of the car and the
three of them departed. After making one short stop, Pope directed Gray
to Bagley Street where she stopped the car. Immediately after exiting the
car, Pope turned toward the two women, pointed a pistol at them and
demanded all their money. When the women made no immediate
response, Pope fired a shot into Gray's head. Kirchheimer reached up
from thepassenger seat and briefly struggled withPope for the gun. After
he pulled free, Pope took a couple of steps away from the car, turned
around and shot Kirchheimer in the back of the head. He then fled the
scene. Gray died from the gun-shot wound to the head. Kirchheimer
survived and testified against Pope at his trial.
2
Kirchheimer told the police that Pope had taken nothing from her,
but that Gray had been carrying a clutch-type purse which was missing
after the shooting. Kirchheimer last remembered seeing the purse be-
tween the front seats. Although Kirchheimer did not actually see Pope
1 The United States Supreme Court, with Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg dissenting, recently denied Pope's petition for a writ of
certiorari. Pope v. Pruett, 1997 WL 429193 (U.S. Aug. 19, 1997). On
that same day, Carlton Jerome Pope was executed by lethal injection.
2 pope v. Netherland, 113 F.3d 1364, 1367 (4th Cir. 1997).
take the purse, she testified that "it was in his view and that he had ample
opportunity 'to grab it without [her] seeing him.'"3
The police examined the car shortly after the two women arrived at
the hospital. In the car, the police found a wine bottle from which they
obtained a fingerprint which positively matched Pope's fingerprint. In
addition to the wine bottle, the police found a checkbook belonging to
Gray in the car between the passenger seat and door. Kirchheimer
testified that Gray had written and cashed a check from her checkbook
earlier that evening and had then placed the checkbook back in her
purse.
4
The jury convicted Pope of capital murder in the commission of a
robbery pursuant to Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(d) 5 and sentenced
him to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed
Pope's conviction and sentence.6 The supreme court held that "where a
killing and a [larceny] are so closely related in time, place, and causal
3Pope v. Netherland, 113 F.3d 1364,1367 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 119,360 S.E.2d 352,355 (1987)).
4 During Pope's second state habeas proceeding, the Common-
wealth produced bank records that indicated that the check Gray wrote
that night did not come from the checkbook found in the car. Thus, in his
second state and federal habeas petitions, Pope contended that the
Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by
failing to disclose exculpatory evidence. Additionally, Pope contended
that the Commonwealth knowingly presented Kirchheimer's false testi-
mony. See, infra, note 56 and accompanying text.
5 This section has since been amended and changed to Virginia
Code Section 18.2-31(4) (1995). See, infra, note 22.
6 Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 360 S.E.2d 352 (1987).
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connection as to make them parts of the same criminal enterprise,"7 a
robbery is established for the purposes of the capital-murder statute.
8
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.9
Pope's first state habeas petition was dismissed by the City of
Portsmouth Circuit Court on August 22, 1989.10 This dismissal was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia and the United States
Supreme Court again denied certiorari. 11 Pope filed a second habeas
petition with the Supreme Court of Virginia pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. This petition was dismissed on September 6, 1991.12
With his state law remedies thus exhausted, Pope filed a habeas
petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. The district court granted a writ of habeas corpus on the
grounds that the Supreme Court of Virginia in Pope v. Commonwealth
13
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
applying an unforeseeable, novel interpretation of robbery retroactively
to the facts of Pope's case.14 The Commonwealth appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit arguing that in Pope v.
Commonwealth the Supreme Court of Virginia's application of the
"common criminal enterprise" rule was neither unforeseeable nor novel
and rooted firmly in the laws of Virginia.
15
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuitreversed and held: (1) Pope's federal due process
claim was not procedurally barred due to his failure to couch the claim
in explicit federal constitutional terms; (2) Pope was not denied due
process of law because the Supreme Court of Virginia did not retroac-
tively apply a novel and unforeseeable interpretation of the law to his
case when it effectively elevated larceny to robbery for the purposes of
the capital murder statute through application of the "common criminal
enterprise" rule; (3) there was no "reasonable likelihood" that allegedly
false testimony presented at trial affected the judgment of the jury and
Pope's false testimony claims were procedurally barred; and (4) Pope's
contention that the Commonwealth failed to divulge exculpatory evi-
dence lacked merit because Pope's counsel could have obtained the
information elsewhere, and thus the Brady rule did not apply. 16
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Preserving a Federal Due Process Claim
The Commonwealth contended that Pope's federal due process
claim was procedurally defaulted because it was "not raised squarely, as
required by law, until the second state habeas petition." 17 The Fourth
7 1d. at 125, 360 S.E.2d at 359.
8 Va. Code § 18.2-31(d) (1985).
9 Pope v. Virginia, 485 U.S. 1015 (1988).
10 Pope v. Netherland, 113 F.3d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1997).
11 Pope v. Thompson, 498 U.S. 908 (1990).
12 Pope v. Netherland, 113 F.3d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1997).
13 234 Va. 114, 360 S.E.2d 352 (1987).
14 Pope v. Netherland, 113 F.3d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1997).
15 Pope, 113 F.3d at 1368.
16 1d. at 1366. The court rejected all of Pope's assignments of error
and held that the district court erred in granting the writ. It rejected
several of Pope's assignments of error without discussion because it
found them to be either procedurally barred or without merit. These
rulings provide little if any guidance because they apply broad, settled
principals of law to facts that are specific to this case. As such, the issues
which are not addressed in this summary include: (1) ineffective assis-
tance of counsel; (2) failure to appoint an independent fingerprint expert;
and (3) arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
171d. at 1368.
Circuit found that although Pope had not raised the federal due process
claim explicitly until the second state habeas petition, he had "squarely
raised the issue whether the evidence was insufficient to convict him as
amatter oflaw" in the stateproceedings. 18 As the court of appeals stated,
"[a]ny challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict in a state
prosecution is necessarily a due process challenge to the conviction." 19
Thus, the court held that "it is notnecessary to cite 'book and verse on the
federal constitution' so long as the constitutional substance of the claim
is evident."'
20
Defense counsel should view this as a very narrow situation in
which they need not federalize this specific objection. The Fourth
Circuit's holding in Pope that a due process claim based on insufficiency
of the evidence was not barred by a failure to "couch ... objections and
challenges in state court in specific constitutional terms ' 21 does not
imply that all federal constitutional claims will receive the same treat-
ment. As a result, attorneys should continue to couch all their objections
in both state and federal terms.
H. Application of "Common Criminal Enterprise" Rule to
Capital Murder
Under the statutory scheme in existence in 1986, Pope committed
four separate crimes. First, he committed petit larceny when he removed
the purse from between the front seats of the car.22 Second, Pope
committed attempted robbery when he pulled the pistol and demanded
money.2 3 Finally, Pope committed murder in the first degree 24 when he
shot Gray and attempted murder in the first degree 25 when he shot
18Id.
19 Pope, 113 F.3d at 1368 (quoting West v. Wright, 931 F.2d 262,
266 (4th Cir. 1991)).
20 Id. (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,278 (1971)).
21 Id.
22 Virginia Code Section 18.2-96(2) (1982) defines petit larceny as
"simple larceny not fromtheperson of another of goods and chattel of the
value of less than $200 .... " While this section has been renumbered,
Virginia Code Section 18.2-96(b) (1995), the content remains the same.
"Larceny" is defined as "the wrongful taking of the goods of another
without the owner's consent and with the intention to permanently
deprive the owner of possession of the goods."Bright v. Commonwealth,
4 Va.App. 248,356 S.E.2d 443 (1987). The crime of larceny is complete
when both the mens rea (the intention to permanently deprive the owner
of possession) and the actus reus (wrongful taking of the goods of
another) are complete. Thus, whenPopetookthepurse from between the
front seats of the car and secreted it in his jacket, the crime was complete.
23 Va. Code §§ 18.2-26 & 18.2-58 (1982). The numbering and
content of these sections remains the same.
24 Va. Code § 18.2-32 (1982). Under the statutory scheme which
was in effect in 1986, attempted robbery was not one of the predicate
felonies listed under Virginia Code Section 18.2-3 1. See Ball v. Com-
monwealth, 221 Va. 754,273 S.E.2d790 (1981) (murderin an attempted
robbery violates section 18.2-32, the first-degree-murder statute, but not
section 18.2-31, the capital-murder statute). Virginia Code Section 18.2-
31(4) was subsequently amended to add attempted robbery as a predicate
felony for purposes of the capital-murder statute. Thus, under the current
statutory scheme, a defendant in Pope's position could be tried for capital
murder without resort to the "common criminal enterprise" rule. Petit
larceny, a misdemeanor, is not a predicate felony for capital murder. Va.
Code § 18.2-31 (1982) & Va. Code § 18.2-31 (1995). Similarly,
"common criminal enterprise" is not mentioned in either version of the
capital-murder statute.
25 Va. Code §§ 18.2-26 & 18.2-32(1985). Underthecurrentversion
of the statutes, Pope would have been guilty of attempted capital murder
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Kirchheimer. The Supreme Court of Virginia26 and the Fourth Circuit,27
however, combined these statutorily distinct crimes into a "common
criminal enterprise" which, in their view, justifies the imposition of the
death penalty. This "common criminal enterprise" interpretation of the
capital-murder statute allows petit larceny to become robbery and, thus,
first degree murder to become capital murder. In essence, these courts
have amended the capital-murder statute by judicial fiat to include
misdemeanor larceny within the underlying felonies required for capital
murder.
This interpretation flies in the face of more than a hundred years of
common law precedent. Robbery is, after all, a common law crime in
Virginia.28 Robbery at common law was defined as the taking, with
intent to steal, the personal property of another, from his or her person or
presence, against his or her will, by violence or intimidation. 29 All
elements of the common-law offense must be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt in order to establish that a robbery has occurred.30 The
essential element of violence or intimidation must precede or be
concomitant with the taking of property from the person or presence of
the owner.3 1 Even the Fourth Circuit itself has explicitly recognized that
"[t]he violence or intimidation that is an essential ingredient of robbery
must precede or be concomitant with the taking."32 In light of this
precedent, the Fourth Circuit's pronouncement that larceny "closely
related in time, place, and causal connection" to a killing amounts to
robbery for the purposes of section 18.2-31(d) is truly troubling. 33
In order to support this seemingly insupportable application of the
"common criminal enterprise" rule, the Supreme Court of Virginia
looked to its first application of the "common criminal enterprise" rule
in a capital-murder proceeding.34 In that case, Briley v. Common-
wealth,35 the defendant and his accomplices robbed the victim at gun
point, forced the victim into his own car and then shot and killed him
some 20 minutes later. 36 In discussing the application of the "common
criminal enterprise" rule to the facts of the case, the courtpointed out that
in a "robbery prosecution, where the violence against the victim and the
trespass to his property combine in a continuing, unbroken sequence of
events, therobberyitselfcontinues as welforthe sameperiod of time.
' 37
pursuant to Virginia Code Sections 18.2-25 and 18.2-31(4) (1995).
26 SeePopev. Commonwealth, 234Va. 114,360 S.E.2d352 (1987).
27 See Pope v. Netherland, 113 F.3d 1364, 1370 (4th Cir. 1997).
28 See Houston v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 257, 12 S.E. 385 (1890).
29 See Pritchard v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 559, 303 S.E.2d 911
(1983).
30 See Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 149, 191 S.E.2d 261
(1972).
3 1Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423,439,304 S.E.2d271,280,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983), 505 U.S. 1230 (1992). See Stamper
v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260,274,257 S.E.2d 808,818 (1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
32 Williams v. Kelly, 816 F.2d 939, 947 (1987) (quoting Stamper,
220 Va. at 274, 257 S.E.2d at 818) (emphasis added).
33 Additionally, the decision in Pope v. Commonwealth defies the
statutorily mandated "strict construction" of criminal statutes. Va. Code
§ 19.2-5 (1982).
34 Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 125, 360 S.E.2d 352, 359
(1987).
35 221 Va. 532, 273 S.E.2d 48 (1980).
36Briley, 221 Va. at 535, 273 S.E.2d at 50.
37 Id. at 543, 273 S.E.2d at 55. See Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218
Va. 1033, 243 S.E.2d 477 (1978) (adopting the "common criminal
enterprise" rule for felony-murder cases).
3 8 Id. at 544, 273 S.E.2d at 55-56.
39 Pope v. Netherland, 113 F.3d 1364, 1368 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing
The court went on to hold that "the killing ... was so closely related in
time, place, and causal connection as to make the killing, as a matter of
law, a part of the same criminal enterprise.
' 38
Regardless of what the Supreme Court of Virginia suggests, Briley
bears no similarity to Pope. First, there was undoubtedly a robbery in
Briley without application of the "common criminal enterprise" rule.
The defendant held a rifle on the victim and demanded his wallet and
keys. This satisfies all the common-law elements of robbery. In Pope,
however, without the "common criminal enterprise" rule, there was only
a larceny. Another key difference is the point in time when violence or
intimidation was used by the defendants. In Briley, intimidation was
used before the taking. In Pope, intimidation and violence were used
only after the taking had been accomplished.
In his federal habeas petition, Pope claimed that the supreme court
"violate[d] the due process clause by applying a novel interpretation of
the law that transform[ed] larceny to robbery as a matter of law in a
context that made the novel change unforeseeable. '39 The Fourth
Circuit rejected this contention because, in its view, the "common
criminal enterprise" rule was first applied to felony murder nearly a
decade earlier 40 and to capital murder seven years earlier. 41 Thus, the
court concluded that use of the "common criminal enterprise" rule in a
capital murder context was not novel; rather, it was "rooted firmly in the
... law of Virginia."
'42
What the court failed to recognize, however, was that all of the other
cases in which the "common criminal enterprise" rule was applied,
including Briley, dealt with actual common-law robberies. The "com-
mon criminal enterprise" rule was applied to bridge the temporal gap
between the robbery and the murder when they did not occur contempo-
raneously. Thus, the application of this rule - in a completely new
situation which effectively elevated petit larceny to felony robbery when
there was force applied after the taking was complete -was a "novel" and
"unforeseeable" interpretation of the capital-murder statute.
The Fourth Circuit did recognize, however, that neither the capital-
murder statute nor the felony-murder statute had ever been applied in a
"Virginia case that dealt with a taking before the use of force."43
Nonetheless, to support the conclusion that the "common criminal
enterprise" rule was neither a "novel" nor an "unforeseeable" interpre-
tation of the law, the court of appeals relied on a case from the Supreme
Court of Connecticut which it claimed applied a "similar" statute to a
"situation quite like Pope's offense."44 In reality, both the applicable
statute and the facts in State v. Gunning,45 the Connecticut case, are quite
different from those in Pope.
First, the distinctions between the Connecticut law at issue in
Gunning and the Virginia law in Pope, render a comparison unreliable.
46
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964)).
40 See Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1033, 243 S.E.2d 477
(1978).
41 Briley, 221 Va. at 543; 273 S.E.2d at 55.
42 Pope, 113 F.3d at 1370.
43 Id. at 1369 (emphasis added).
44 1d.
45 183 Conn. 299, 439 A.2d 339 (1981).
46 Gunning dealt with the Connecticut court's interpretation of its
felony-murder statute, Connecticut General Statutes Section 53a-53c
(1975), not its capital murder statute. Although the Fourth Circuit
recognized this fact, it still asserted that the Connecticut felony-murder
statute and the Virginia capital-murder statute, Virginia Code Section
18.2-31(d) (1985), contained "similar" provisions. Pope, 113 F.3d at
1369. This statement is true, but only to the extent that both statutes
contained the words "murder" and "robbery." Beyond this similarity,
however, the Connecticut felony-murder statute is, not surprisingly,
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Robbery is a statutorily defined crime in Connecticut.47 In Virginia,
however, it is purely a common-law crime.48 In stark contrast to the
common-law definition of robbery applicable in Virginia, the Connecti-
cut robbery statute explicitly accounts for the application of force after
the taking.49 In Virginia, the force or threat of force must "proceed or
be concomitant with the taking of property from the person or presence
of the owner."50 Force applied after the taking is complete is insufficient
under the Virginia common law definition of robbery.
5 1
Although the cases might appear to be more similar factually than
they are legally, they are not nearly as similar as the Fourth Circuit
suggests. The factual chain of events in Gunning was virtually unknown.
Although the evidence showed that defendant fled the area of the victim's
house about the time the victim died and possessed the murder weapon
and items from the victim's house shortly after the killing,52 there was
no evidence of the events which immediately preceded and followed the
killing. Thus, the court found that the jury could have reasonably inferred
that a robbery, within the meaning of the Connecticut statute, had
occurred and that the murderoccurred in furtherance ofthatrobbery. The
chain of events in Pope, however, was fairly certain. Pope took the purse
from between the seats of the car, got out, pulled the gun, demanded
money, received none, shot Gray and then shot Kirchheimer.53 This
chain of events does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the
murder was committed "in the commission of [a completed, not an
attempted] robbery" as required by Virginia Code Section 18.2-31 (d). In
short, Gunning provides very weak support on both legal and factual
grounds for the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Pope.
After Pope, defense counsel in Virginia must remain aware of the
latitude given the Commonwealth in its attempts to convict a defendant
of capital murder. Attorneys must force the Commonwealth to prove
every element of its case and refuse to acquiesce in the prosecutor's
interpretation of the statute. Additionally, counsel should always request
jury instructions which edify their theory of the case. Here, for example,
counsel should have requested a larceny instruction54 and should have
much more similar to the Virginia felony-murder statute, Virginia Code
Section 18.2-32 (1985). Pope did notconcern application ofthe Virginia
felony-murder statute.
47 Connecticut General Statutes Section 53a-133 (1975) (emphasis
added) defined robbery as follows:
"A person commits robbery when, in the course of committing a
larceny, he uses or threatens immediate use of physical force upon
another person for the purpose of:
(1) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of the
property orto the retention thereof immediately after the taking;
or
(2) compelling the owner of such property or another person
to deliver up the property or to engage in other conduct which
aids in the commission of the larceny.
48 See, supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
49 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-133(1) (1975).
50 Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423,439,304 S.E.2d 271,280,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983), 505 U.S. 1230 (1992) (citing Stamper
v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260,274,257 S.E.2d 808, 818 (1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980)).
51 Unless of course one is being accused of capital murder.
52 State v. Gunning, 183 Conn. 299,310,439 A.2d 338,346 (1981).
53 Pope v. Netherland, 113 F.3d 1364, 1367 (4th Cir. 1997).
54 Pope, 113 F.3d at 1372. Pope's assertion that this failure
constituted ineffective assistance was found to be procedurally barred
because it was not raised until the second state habeas petition. Id.
objected upon refusal on both federal due process and state grounds. 55
III. Use of Allegedly False Testimony
Pope also alleged that false testimony was admitted at his trial.
56
This allegedly false testimony consisted primarily of the testimony of
Kirchheimerregardingboth Gray's checkbook andherowninvolvement
with drugs and alcohol.
Kirchheimer testified that Gray wrote a check shortly before the
encounter with Pope and then returned her checkbook to her purse.
Kirchheimer further testified that Gray had only one checkbook. After
the shooting, a checkbook belonging to Gray was found on the floor of
the car between the passenger seat and the passenger-side door. In its
attempt to characterize the larceny of the purse as robbery, the Common-
wealth theorized that "after killing Gray, Pope took the purse during the
struggle with [Kirchheimer] and the checkbook fell out ...."57 During
the proceedings on Pope's second state habeas petition, the Common-
wealth produced copies of Gray's checks which established that the
check Gray wrote was not from the checkbook found on the floor of the
car. Since the Commonwealth knew this, Pope alleged that the Common-
wealth knowingly presented Kirchheimer's false testimony.
58
Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit agreed that this claim
was procedurally barred because it was not raised in either the state trial
court or in the first state habeas petition and because Pope failed to
establish either cause orprejudice- even though Pope did not have actual
knowledge of the discrepancies until the proceedings on his second state
habeas petition.59 The Fourth Circuit held that "a reasonable and
diligent" investigation by defense counsel would have turned up the
discrepancies during trial.60 Rather than explain exactly what consti-
tutes a "reasonable and diligent" investigation, the court merely cited its
decision in Hoke v. Netherland.61 An important factor in the court's
reasoning seems to have been that because Kirchheimer testified about
the checks in open court, defense counsel knew about the checks and
should have investigated. Further, because the checks were in the hands
of a third party who had no reason to refuse to cooperate with defense
counsel, counsel could have discovered them with minimal effort.
62
Additionally, Pope alleged that Kirchheimer gave false testimony
regarding her involvement with drugs and alcohol. 63 While Kirchheimer
testified that she drank "as many as four beers that night,"64 the
prosecution had information that Kirchheimer drank "5 maybe 6" beers
and that a police officer on the scene that night characterized her as
"drunk and confused." 65 On this issue, the court held that a "conviction
must only be reversed if there is 'any reasonable likelihood' that
testimony the Commonwealth knew or should have known to be false
55 See Cooper, "The Never Ending Story: Combating Procedural
Bars in Capital Cases," Cap. Def. J., Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 38.




60 Pope, 113 F.3d. at 1371.
61 92F.3d 1350 (4th Cir. 1996). See Case Summary of Hoke, Cap.
Def. J., Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 5.
62 Pope, 113 F.3d at 1371. The same reasoning applies to Pope's
contention that the Commonwealth withheld exculpatory evidence con-
cerning the existence of the checkbookinviolation ofBrady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963). On this issue, the court held that "the failure of the
Commonwealth to divulge [Gray's] bank records did not preclude Pope
from obtaining the evidence elsewhere, [thus] the Brady rule does not
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affected the judgment of the jury." 66 In applying this test to the facts, the
court found that there was no "reasonable probability" that the "poten-
tially false testimony" regarding Kirchheimer's involvement with drugs
and alcohol affected the jury'sjudgment. The courtreasoned that the jury
heard quite a bit of evidence regarding Kirchheimer's past, including her
arrest record for drugs and prostitution.
It is unclear exactly what effect the decision in Pope will have on
future cases in which prisoners allege that the government knowingly
used perjured testimony to obtain a conviction. It bears mention,
however, that the Supreme Court has, on several occasions held that "a
State may not knowingly use ... false testimony to obtain a tainted
conviction." 67 Further, this principle applies even if "the false testimony
goes only to the credibility of the witness."'68 In Pope, Kirchheimer's
66 Pope, 113 F.3d at 1371 (quoting United States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d
929, 933 (4th Cir. 1994)). This test seems to favor the Commonwealth,
as it did in this situation, to a significant degree.
67 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). See United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
allegedly false testimony regarding her use of alcohol that night bore
directly on her credibility; however, the court of appeals determined that
there was no "reasonable probability" that it affected the jury.
The court's decision on this issue should be an important lesson to
defense counsel: counsel should attempt to follow every lead and
investigate every issue which is practicable, especially when a witness
gives questionable testimony. It is also important, as always, for
attorneys to make their objections as early in the proceedings as possible
in order to avoid the dreaded procedural bar in subsequent proceedings.




111 F.3d 1126 (4th Cir. 1997)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On July 24, 1988, Roy Bruce Smith drank approximately fourteen
beers between2:30p.m. and 8:30p.m. Mr. Smithwasupsetby his wife's
failure to invite him to her company picnic as well as other indications
that she might have left him. Shortly after 8:30 p.m. Mr. Smith went to
sit on his front porch armed with a .357 magnum, a .44 magnum, and an
assault rifle with a bayonet attached. 1 At 8:45 p.m., Mr. Smith's next-
door neighbor, Mr. Cottrell, saw Mr. Smith sitting on the frontporch. Mr.
Smith told Cottrell that his wife had left him and "that he was 'not going
to make it through the night." 2 While Mr. Smith and Mr. Cottrell talked,
Mr. Smith fired a shot in the air, and, a few minutes later, fired a couple
shots in the general direction of two kids across the street who had set off
some fireworks.3 Saying he "had enough",Mr. Cottrell wentback inside
his home to which Mr. Smith replied, "I hope somebody calls the police
because I'll shoot the first one that arrives and I hope they shoot me in
return.' 4 Another neighbor, Mr. Wood, remonstrated Mr. Smith for
firing his gun. As Mr. Wood walked away, Mr. Smith said that he was
waiting for somebody to call the police and that "I'll probably shoot the
first one that I see."'5 Mr. Wood called the police and warned them that
Mr. Smith was armed.
Around 9:00 p.m. several police officers arrived but parked where
their vehicles would not arouse Mr. Smith's suspicions. Officer Ander-
son saw Mr. Smith sitting on the front porch and told the dispatcher to
1 Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 248-49, 389 S.E.2d 871,
873 (1990).
21d. at 249, 389 S.E.2d at 873.
31d., 389 S.E.2d at 874.
41d.
5Id.
6 Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. at 250, 389 S.E.2d at 874.
"[h]ave a unit cruise around.., to the rear of the townhouses."'6 This
order was relayed to Sgt. John Conner, a uniformed officer, who was en
route. At this point, Mr. Smith, who was still out front, suddenly got up
and went inside when "some person... started across the street." 7 A few
moments later Sgt. Conner radioed that, "I've got him in sight he's
coming out the back door." 8 Other officers headed to the back of Mr.
Smith's house. One of the officers, James K. Ryan, heard Sgt. Conner
say, "[d]rop the rifle, drop the rifle now," followed by gunfire consisting
of eight to twelve sharp cracks, a short pop, and then more sharp cracks. 9
Officer Ryan found Sgt. Conner lying on the ground in the alleyway.
Officer Steven Bamford found Mr. Smith crouching down next to the
back deck with the rifle across his lap. Officer Bamford got Mr. Smith
to drop his rifle, but he refused to comply with Officer Bamford's order
to put his hands on the ground, walk out, and lay flat. A struggle ensued
as several officers tried to take the rifle and the two revolvers away from
him. During the struggle he requested that the officers "[g]o ahead and
kill [him]." 10 After Mr. Smith was handcuffed and placed in leg
restraints he said "that Conner was the 'first priority, take care of him,
take care of him. He's one of us, one of ours." ' 11 Sgt. Conner died
several hours later. Although sustaining several wounds, it was a head
wound that proved to be fatal.
12
Mr. Smith was convicted of the willful, deliberate, and premedi-








13 This section has been changed to Virginia Code section 18.2-
31(6).
